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DID ALEXANDER THE GREAT READ XENOPHON? 
 
It has been assumed by writers, ancient and modern, that Xenophon’s literary output 
had a direct influence on Alexander the Great. But is there any evidence to prove that 
it did? In spite of the paucity of references to Xenophon in the surviving Alexander 
sources, many writers, both ancient and modern, have no doubts concerning the 
influence of Xenophon’s writings on Alexander. An extreme position is suggested by 
Eunapius, the sophist and historian born at Sardis c. AD 345, when he says in his 
Lives of the Sophists (VS I, 453): ‘Alexander the Great would not have become great 
if there had been no Xenophon’.1 However, Eunapius might mean little more than 
Alexander had heard of, and been inspired by, what Xenophon had done in Asia. We 
are looking for evidence that Alexander had read Xenophon; most modern literature 
is in no doubt that he did. Almost all the major monographs on Alexander, those by 
Wilcken, Robinson, Tarn, Hammond and Lane Fox, among others, take it for granted 
that Alexander had read and learned from Xenophon.2  
Did Alexander read Xenophon while being tutored by Aristotle? If he did not 
read Xenophon at Mieza under Aristotle’s guidance, then he surely did so later: it 
would seem perfectly reasonable for someone preparing for an anabasis into Asia to 
read Xenophon’s writings on that very topic. Lane Fox is quite emphatic about it:  
 
No Macedonian had ever seen so far into Asia, and only one Greek 
general had described it; Xenophon the Athenian, who led the Ten 
Thousand Greeks through Mesopotamia at the turn of the century, and 
recorded the march in his memoirs. Faced with the Euphrates he had 
been shown how to cross it on rafts of stuffed skins; at the Danube, 
Alexander evidently turned to a trick he had read in a military 
history.3  
 
Lane Fox is asserting clearly that Alexander not only knew of some of Xenophon’s 
exploits, but that he knew also of major themes in Xenophon’s writings and that he 
absorbed the details of the texts themselves and made use of them.  
It may well be the case that Alexander did indeed read the writings of 
Xenophon, but the simple assumption that he did so needs to be challenged. Can we 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that Alexander actually read Xenophon? Is 
                                                 
1 I borrow the reference to Eunapius from Due, B., Alexander’s Inspiration and Ideas’, 54. Due is herself obliged to Wayne Dye, 
J. for this reference to Eunapius, ‘In search of the Philosopher King’, Archaeological News XI (1982).  
2 See the list and specific references in Due, B., ‘Alexander’s Inspiration and Ideas’, 59 note 3. To this list may be added P. Brunt 
who says that Alexander ‘is likely to have read Xenophon’ in Anabasis Alexandri, volume 1, 147, footnote 4. 
the modern assumption that Alexander read Xenophon simply part of the legacy of 
Plutarch’s general supposition that Alexander had regard for all things Greek? This 
paper sets out to explore this nexus of problems. 
Plutarch informs us that Alexander was indeed well read. He tells us that he was 
‘devoted by nature to all kinds of learning and was a lover of books’.4 Later he adds 
that Alexander  
 
regarded the Iliad as a handbook of the great art of war and took with 
him on his campaigns a text annotated by Aristotle, which became 
known as the casket copy and which he always kept under his pillow 
together with his dagger. When his campaigns had taken him far into 
the interior of Asia and he could find no other books, he ordered his 
treasurer Harpalus to send him some. Harpalus sent him the histories 
of Philistus, many of the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and 
Euripides, and the dithyrambic poems of Telestes and Philoxenus.5  
 
 
This list in Plutarch makes no specific mention of Xenophon. This does not mean of 
course that he had not read Xenophon; in fact, it might imply the opposite: he already 
knew by heart what Xenophon had to say.  
The surviving primary source material relating to Alexander makes little 
explicit mention of Xenophon, with a few notable exceptions. Before the battle of 
Issus, Arrian informs us that Alexander reminded his troops of the feat of Xenophon 
and the Ten Thousand in routing the ‘Great King and his whole power near 
Babylon’.6 This of course does not prove that Alexander read Xenophon but only that 
he knew of the Ten Thousand’s exploits. Moreover, since this is found in Arrian’s 
history of Alexander, and since Arrian was a devotee of Xenophon, it is not 
unreasonable for us to be suspicious with regard to the historicity of this incident. 
Arrian is without doubt our best source for Alexander the Great, but since Arrian 
clearly modelled himself on Xenophon, any reference to Xenophon, or his writings in 
Arrian, needs to be treated with caution. 7  
At this point I should note that it would be misleading to suggest that the 
question of Xenophon’s literary influence on Alexander has not been addressed 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Lane Fox, R., Alexander the Great, 83. 
4 Plutarch, Alexander, 8. 
5 Plutarch, Alexander, 8. See Brown, T.S., ‘Alexander’s Book Order (Plut. Alex. 8)’ 359-368 for analysis of this passage. 
6 Arrian, Anabasis, 2. 7. 8-9. 
7 See Bosworth, A.B., Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, Volume I, 6-7 where Bosworth remarks on the general 
influence that Xenophon had on Arrian. Bosworth admits that this is not as obvious in Arrian’s history of Alexander but 
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before. One of the first to investigate this topic was Freya Stark in her book 
Alexander’s Path from Caria to Cilicia, first published in 1958. Stark highlights what 
she considers to be the obvious influence of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia on the behaviour 
of Alexander. The Cyropaedia was a semi-fictional account of the life of Cyrus the 
Great, the founder of the Persian Empire. Stark, prima facie, does put forward a case 
to suggest that Alexander read at least the Cyropaedia. As she notes sagely: ‘Anyone 
with a military or exploring mind would obviously study him [Xenophon] carefully 
before setting out on the Persian adventure’.8 However, in presenting parallels 
between the behaviour of Xenophon’s Cyrus and Arrian’s Alexander the Great,9 it 
seems to me that she does not give due recognition to the fact that Arrian was closely 
modelling himself on Xenophon the writer; Stark is therefore not critical enough of 
Arrian’s references to Xenophon, and Arrian’s consequent representation of the 
Alexander. Some of the parallels between Xenophon’s Cyrus and Arrian’s Alexander 
are striking, but are they result of Xenophon’s influence on Arrian as opposed to 
Alexander’s imitation of Cyrus?  
Prima facie, Stark’s methodology here is sound in that she attempts to locate 
important parallels between Cyrus and Alexander in sources besides Arrian. Sensibly 
she chooses Curtius Rufus a writer in the vulgate10 tradition, who is often at odds with 
Arrian’s representation of Alexander. This modus operandi is prudent, as Stark 
attempts to list references to ideas common to both Arrian and Curtius which would 
help support her view that the original idea came from Xenophon’s Cyrus, and was 
not simply a literary creation of Arrian; but ultimately, she fails in her execution of 
this. When one checks her references to Curtius one finds that they do not always 
indicate parallels in Arrian. A number of them are simply inaccurate and make no 
sense in terms of her argument.11 More importantly, Stark notes herself that many of 
the parallels between Cyrus and Alexander are not significant evidence that 
Alexander read the Cyropaedia since they describe incidents that would follow on 
naturally to anyone in command. Many of these incidents are, in her own words, ‘a 
                                                                                                                                            
nevertheless it is a constant in his writings. As Bosworth notes Arrian was celebrated as the ‘new Xenophon’ and in his work the 
Order of Battle he simply calls himself Xenophon.  
8 Stark, F., Alexander’s Path, 203. 
9 Stark, F., Ibid., 203-5.  
10 The source material for Alexander the Great can be divided into two traditions: the vulgate and the non-vulgate. The vulgate 
tradition is so called because the writers in this tradition primarily utilised the history of Cleitarchus, written c. 300 BC at 
Alexandria. This is the common (vulgar) source for writers in this tradition, represented by Curtius Rufus and Diodorus Siculus. 
The writers in the non-vulgate tradition, represented by Arrian and Plutarch, used a wider range of source material. 
11 See the references given by Stark in footnotes 24, 25, 28 and 30 on p. 265 of Alexander’s Path. 
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commonplace of general-ship’.12 Similar parallels then could be found between any 
two commanders. In addition Stark admits that Alexander’s actions were those ‘which 
anyone of that age might have thought of for himself’.13  
Stark’s assessment has been commented on before, most recently by Due,14 
who quite correctly notes that Stark is not always accurate and is sometimes 
confused.15 Yet one can perhaps find fault with Due also. She, like Stark, in her 
assessment of the influence of Xenophon’s writings limits herself essentially to the 
semi-fictional Cyropaedia and attempts to assess the importance of Xenophon’s 
Cyrus as a precursor to Alexander through an examination in the main of Arrian and 
Plutarch from among the available source material. But since Arrian was clearly 
influenced strongly by Xenophon the writer, it is dangerous, as I have suggested, to 
pay too much attention to simple parallels between the behaviour of Cyrus and 
Alexander in Arrian. Plutarch is not much better as a source to examine in avoiding 
the direct influence of Xenophon the writer. Plutarch too belongs to the non-vulgate 
tradition of Arrian; he is also clearly enamoured of his subject.16 In the Life of 
Alexander he goes to great lengths to stress the philosophical ‘self-control’ of his 
subject.’17 A more revealing modus operandi would involve an attempt to focus on 
the paralleling of incidents or ideology in Xenophon with incidents or ideology that is 
common to a variety of Alexander sources, including especially the vulgate tradition 
of Curtius Rufus and Diodorus Siculus. Incidents or ideology associated with 
Alexander common to all sources cannot be the literary creation of Arrian. When we 
can locate incidents or ideology in Xenophon’s writings that find a parallel in material 
common to all or most of the sources for Alexander, then we might say with more 
certainty that Alexander had read his Xenophon.  
I do not think then that either Stark or Due demonstrates convincingly that 
Alexander read Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and acted on the information therein. On the 
basis of the more secure methodology noted above, the Cyropaedia is a text that 
yields at least one interesting parallel between Xenophon and Alexander. All sources 
for Alexander record his adoption of Persian dress and custom.18 Some give him 
                                                 
12 Stark, F., Ibid., 204. 
13 Stark, F., Ibid., 205. 
14 Due, B., ‘Alexander’s Inspiration and Ideas’, 53-60. 
15 Ibid., 54. 
16 Whitmarsh, T., ‘Alexander’s Hellenism and Plutarch’s Textualism’, 174-192 suggests that Plutarch was himself strongly 
influenced through reading Xenophon.  
17 Whitmarsh, T., Ibid., 181.  
18 See Curtius Rufus 6. 6. 1-10, Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 45. 1-4, Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheke, 17. 77. 4-5 and Arrian, 4. 7. 
4-5. 
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different reasons for doing so but none deny that he did. In the Cyropaedia, Cyrus 
adopts Median clothes and customs; he also persuades his associates to wear the 
Median dress, something Alexander would later do. Indeed the complaint of 
Artabarus in the Cyropaedia might have come word for word, mutatis mutandis, from 
the mouth of any one of Alexander’s older Macedonian guards:  
 
We have taken Babylon; and we have borne down all before us; and 
yet, by Mithras, yesterday, had I not made my way with my fist 
through the multitude, I would not have been able to come near you 
(Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 7. 5. 53, Miller tr.).  
 
Is this solid evidence of Alexander having read Xenophon? Perhaps. But there must 
have been many tales about Cyrus available in the oral tradition. Is this something that 
Alexander simply heard about?  
I began with the Cyropaedia because that is the work that both Stark and Due 
examine, but, in my opinion, to assess the influence of Xenophon’s writings on 
Alexander the most obvious work to consider first is the Anabasis. In 401 Xenophon, 
working as an Athenian mercenary in the pay of Cyrus ‘the younger’, marched into 
the heart of Asia as far as Cunaxa, just north of Babylon.19 Cyrus was attempting to 
remove his elder brother Artaxerxes from the throne. The plan floundered at the battle 
of Cunaxa where Cyrus was killed. After the generals of the mercenary Greek army 
had been murdered, Xenophon led the remnants back up the Tigris valley through the 
mountains of Armenia to the Black Sea. From there they travelled along the coast 
back to Thrace. Many years later Xenophon wrote an account of this journey, which 
has come down to us as the Anabasis.  
Later in 334 Alexander made a much more successful journey to Babylon. It 
seems reasonable to assume that Alexander would have read Xenophon’s Anabasis 
before setting out on his Asian campaign. But the question remains: is there any 
evidence to confirm that he did? Let us begin with what is, perhaps, his most obvious 
reason for doing so: the topography of their respective routes to Babylon. Although on 
the face of it they might appear to have travelled along two different paths, there are 
in fact some important overlaps. They both passed through Sardis, Celaenae, Tarsus, 
Issus and Myriandrus. There is no speculation about this; these places are mentioned 
in both accounts. At Myriandrus they changed direction. Alexander went south to 
                                                 
19 Cunaxa was in all probability quite close to where modern Baghdad stands today. 
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secure the Phoenician coast and then travelled into Egypt, while Xenophon and Cyrus, 
having crossed the Euphrates, went down its valley straight to Cunaxa. Later, 
however, their routes overlap again. After his time in Egypt Alexander came north 
again through Damascus to Thapsacus on the Euphrates. But instead of going south 
along Xenophon’s route he crossed instead to the Tigris, and having traversed it, 
fought his last major battle against Darius at Gaugamela. Then he turned south along 
the Tigris to Babylon, the same route, though in the opposite direction, that Xenophon 
took after Cunaxa. So Xenophon knew and does describe the topography of a 
considerable stretch of the journey that Alexander later set out on. 
Had Alexander read Xenophon’s Anabasis, what might he have learned in 
terms of the topography and its associated problems? The first parallel that one comes 
across occurs in the fording of a river. In Xenophon’s case this was the Euphrates. He 
tells us that the soldiers took skins which they had for tent covers, filled them with 
hay, sewed the edges together and floated across. (Xenophon, Anabasis, 1. 5. 10). 
Alexander, before crossing into Asia, attacked the Getae who had settled on the far 
side of the Ister (Danube). Arrian tells us that Alexander ‘filled the leather tent covers 
with hay … and ferried across as much of his force as he could in this way (Arrian, 
Anabasis, 1. 3. 6). However, this was perhaps by then standard military procedure, 
and Alexander need not necessarily have learned it from Xenophon.  
When Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia Minor he took the coastal 
route through Sardis, Ephesus, Miletus and Halicarnassus on through the regions of 
Caria and Lycia. Interestingly enough Alexander, after the siege of Halicarnassus, 
sent Parmenion with the cavalry and the baggage train back to Sardis and then to 
Gordium. Clearly Alexander was well informed about the terrain that he would face in 
Caria and Lycia, which was not favourable for cavalry.20 This suggests that regardless 
of Xenophon, local guides were used as reliable sources of information. Alexander 
then marched through Greater Phrygia to Gordium then south to the Cilician Gates, 
which was the only route from north to south through the Taurus Mountains. One 
explicit point of contact between Xenophon and Alexander then is the Gates leading 
into Cilicia. Did Alexander use Xenophon’s account at this point? Our secondary 
literature takes it for granted that he did. Regarding the passes through Cilicia, 
Hammond notes:  
                                                 
20 See Hamilton, J.R., Alexander the Great, 61.  
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 Alexander was certainly aware of these strategic problems for having 
read Xenophon’s Anabasis he knew how Cyrus had passed that way, 
and he was in touch with the Greeks of the locality.21  
 
But in comparing the two passages the only things Alexander would seem to have 
learned from Xenophon’s account is that there were gates through the mountains, and 
that they were narrow. Native scouts could easily have told him both of these things. 
In fact, if one compares the passages one sees that Cyrus had a specific plan: 
 
From there they made ready to try to enter Cilicia. Now the entrance 
was by a wagon-road, exceedingly steep and impracticable for an 
army to pass if there was anybody to oppose it; and in fact, as report 
ran, Syennesis [king of Cilicia] was upon the heights, guarding the 
entrance; therefore Cyrus remained for a day in the plain. On the 
following day, however, a messenger came with word that Syennesis 
had abandoned the heights, because he had learned that Menon’s army 
[Thessalian general in the pay of Alexander] was already in Cilicia, on 
his own side of the mountains, and because, further, he was getting 
reports that triremes belonging to the Lacedaemonians and to Cyrus 
were sailing around from Ionia to Cilicia under the command of 
Tamos [Egyptian admiral in the pay of Cyrus]. At any rate Cyrus 
climbed the mountains without seeing any opposition, and saw the 
camp where the Cilicians had been keeping guard (Xenophon, 
Anabasis, 1. 2. 21-22, Brownson tr.). 
 
First of all Menon was sent by a different route into Cilicia and Cyrus also sent 
triremes around the coast to by-pass the Gates. Does Alexander prepare in either of 
these ways? No.  
 
He himself marched to Cappadocia, won over all the country this side 
of the Halys and much beyond it. He made Sabictas satrap of 
Cappadocia and pushed on himself to the Cilician Gates. When he 
reached the camp of Cyrus, who had been with Xenophon, and saw 
that the Gates were strongly held, he left Parmenio there with the 
heavy armed foot-battalions, while he himself, about the first watch, 
took the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians, and marched by night to 
the Gates, meaning to take the guards unawares. His march was 
detected, but his daring counted just as much in his favour; the guards, 
he was leading in person, left their posts in flight. Next day at dawn he 
passed the Gates with his full force and descended into Cilicia (Arrian, 
Anabasis, 2. 4. 2-3, Brunt tr.). 
                                                 
21 Hammond, N.G.L., Alexander the Great: King, Commander, and Statesman, 92. 
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 Lane Fox, who takes Alexander’s knowledge of Xenophon for granted, suggests that:  
 
From his readings of Xenophon’s works, he could reason that he 
would shortly be faced by the defile of the Cilician Gates, impassible 
if obstructed by the enemy. There are ways over the surrounding 
shoulders of the Golek-Boghaz hills which do avoid the extreme 
narrows of the pass, but Alexander decided to force it. Either he made 
no reconnaissance, in the absence of native guides, or he reckoned like 
Xenophon, he could scare the defenders into withdrawal. 22
 
 But that is not what happens in Xenophon’s Anabasis. Cyrus had already, as was 
noted above, made plans to circumvent the Gates. Alexander made no such plans. He 
arrived to find the Gates blocked; he left the heavy infantry with Parmenio and with 
light-armed troops prepared a night attack. No pre-planning is evident and no thought 
is given to any circumventing manoeuvres. He seems to arrive at the Gates without 
any thought concerning the difficulties that Cyrus had faced here. Curtius also 
describes this event and gives much the same version as Arrian. In Curtius’ version 
the Gates are abandoned because only a few are left to guard them while the rest 
finally follow Memnon the Greek’s23 plan of laying waste the land, originally 
suggested at the Granicus. When the few guards left behind to hold the Gates realise 
they are being abandoned, they flee also. Both sources then agree that Alexander 
simply showed up and was able to force the pass through good fortune as much as 
anything else.  
So far, then, there is, in terms of topographical knowledge, little to suggest that 
Alexander learned anything from Xenophon’s Anabasis. Soon after this incident the 
battle of Issus was fought and then Alexander went south with his policy of 
thalassocracy while Xenophon crossed the Euphrates and headed for Babylon. Almost 
two years later Alexander returned via Damascus to Thapsacus, having taken control 
of Egypt. What happens after this may be of significance. Alexander did not follow 
Xenophon’s route down the Euphrates valley. Why? In the first place, the journey by 
Xenophon resulted in catastrophic conditions for the army: 
 
Thence Cyrus marched thirteen stages through desert country, ninety 
parasangs, keeping the Euphrates on the right, and arrived at Pylae. In 
                                                 
22 Lane-Fox, R., Alexander the Great, 154-155. 
23 Memnon the Greek was, as his epithet suggests, a Greek mercenary fighting on the Persian side, as a great many Greek 
mercenaries did.  
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the course of these stages many of the baggage animals died of 
hunger, for there was no fodder and, in fact, no growing thing of any 
kind, but the land was absolutely bare; and the people who dwelt here 
made a living by quarrying mill-stones along the river banks, then 
fashioning them and taking them to Babylon, where they sold them 
and bought grain in exchange. As for the troops, their supply of grain 
gave out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian 
market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus (Xenophon, Anabasis, 
1. 4. 5-6, Brownson tr.) 
 
 
By contrast, Alexander’s route aimed to circumvent such difficulties: 
 
 
Thence he continued inland through the country called Mesopotamia, 
keeping on his left the Euphrates and the mountains of Armenia. On 
setting out from the Euphrates he did not take the direct route for 
Babylon, since by going the other road all supplies were easier to 
obtain for the army, green fodder for the horses and provisions for the 
country, and the heat was less intense (Arrian, Anabasis, 3. 7. 3, Brunt 
tr.). 
 
This at least seems to be a topographical/logistical element in Xenophon’s Anabasis 
of which Alexander might well have utilised.24 But once again both Arrian and 
Curtius inform us that at this point that Alexander heard that Darius was at the Tigris 
and so to the Tigris Alexander went. His concern was to defeat Darius and not simply 
to take Babylon. Xenophon’s logistical information, if it was considered at all, lies 
unused. Alexander and Darius faced up to each other at Gaugamela where Darius was 
soundly defeated and never again faced Alexander in the field. So much then for the 
topography in Xenophon’s Anabasis. Alexander seemingly makes little use of it. 
Perhaps it is not really surprising that there is so little direct evidence in Arrian 
or Curtius to suggest that Alexander read Xenophon if we are only discussing 
topography or logistics. Whatever Alexander might have read he would still have 
used his own scouting system to determine the geography ahead of him and the 
logistics required to cross these regions. He was also surely better off with recent 
eyewitness accounts than an account written by Xenophon years before.  
But in other areas, Lane Fox continually asserts that Alexander learned much 
from Xenophon’s Anabasis, especially Persian habits.25 He also suggests that 
Alexander’s father, Philip, learned about ‘oriental hazards’ in general from the literary 
                                                 
24 In general see Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, who argues that logistics limited 
and conditioned Alexander’s strategies.  
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works of Xenophon.26 But can these suppositions be substantiated? In fact, Alexander 
seems at times wilfully to ignore the information available in Xenophon’s Anabasis. 
For instance Xenophon notes:  
 
Furthermore, one who observes closely could see at a glance that 
while the King’s empire was strong in its extent of territory and 
number of inhabitants, it was weak by reason of the greatness of the 
distances and the scattered condition of its forces, in case one should 
be swift in making his attack upon it (Xenophon, Anabasis, 1. 5. 9, 
Brownson tr.). 
  
Yet after Issus Alexander chose instead to secure the East Coast of the Mediterranean 
giving Darius almost two years to regroup for Guagamela. Xenophon’s Anabasis, the 
text that we might have expected to be most influential, yields little concrete evidence 
to support that Alexander did in fact read it since he does not use the information 
contained in it, in fact, he acts in a complete opposite way to that found in 
Xenophon’s account. Xenophon’s blitzkrieg is ignored in favour of a much more 
cautious approach.  
But Xenophon’s writings on Persia contained other kinds of information besides 
those just discussed. Most importantly, he records also his experiences of interaction 
with the Persians: how they behaved, what they believed, how they fought. This sort 
of information might have been of greater use to Alexander, but is there any concrete 
evidence to suggest that he made use of it? One episode that may be examined is the 
crossing of the Granicus river: unfortunately the source material that covers the battle 
at the Granicus river tantalisingly conflicts. If Alexander had read his Xenophon he 
would have known what to do at the Granicus:  
 
As soon as it came to be late in the afternoon, it was time for the 
enemy to withdraw. For in no instance did the barbarians encamp at a 
distance of less than sixty stadia from the Greek camp, out of fear that 
the Greeks might attack them during the night. For a Persian army at 
night is a sorry thing. Their horses are tethered, and usually hobbled 
also to prevent their running away if they get loose from the tether, 
and hence in the case of any alarm a Persian has to put a saddle and 
bridle on his horse, and then has also to put on his own breastplate and 
mount his horse – and all these things are difficult at night and in the 
midst of confusion. It was for this reason that the Persians encamped 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Lane Fox, R., Alexander the Great, 122, 138.  
26 Ibid., 72. 
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at a considerable distance from the Greeks (Xenophon, Anabasis, 3. 4. 
34-35, Brunt tr.). 
 
Xenophon argues that it is best to attack the Persians at night. According to Arrian, 
however, Alexander attacked immediately on reaching the Granicus and was 
successful after a fierce struggle in which he came close to losing his life. Arrian 
records also that Parmenio had suggested that an immediate attack would be an error. 
For this suggestion he found himself on the end of a put-down by Alexander. To 
Parmenio’s objections about fighting at once Alexander says: 
 
All this I know, Parmenio, but I should feel ashamed if after crossing 
the Hellespont easily, this petty stream (by this epithet did he belittle 
the Granicus) hinders us from crossing, just as we are (Arrian, 
Anabasis, 1. 13. 7, Brownson tr.).  
 
Interestingly Parmenio’s objections to an immediate attack, and his desire to postpone 
the assault until the following morning, seem indeed to be based on the sort of 
knowledge to be found in the Xenophon passage quoted above. Parmenio wanted to 
postpone an immediate attack because the Macedonians had superior numbers in 
terms of infantry and knowing that the Persians would not camp close to the 
riverbank at night, he thought it wiser for the Macedonians to attempt to cross early in 
the morning and make full use of their numerical advantage. Had he, and not 
Alexander, read his Xenophon? 
The vulgate tradition though, preserved in Diodorus Siculus, gives a different 
version of events to that in Arrian. In Diodorus, Alexander does indeed wait and cross 
the Granicus at dawn, unopposed, presumably, because the Persians had withdrawn a 
sufficient distance to make camp at night. It may well be that Arrian chose a version 
of the events that allowed him to continue with a theme that runs throughout his 
history, namely the timid behaviour and limited thinking of Parmenio contrasted with 
Alexander’s decisive and courageous mentality.27 If the vulgate tradition contains the 
truth of what actually happened, it may indeed provide evidence that Alexander had 
read his Xenophon.  
Another feature of Alexander’s military technique was his speed of movement. 
This tactical feature was particularly important considering the size of the Persian 
                                                 
27 See Arrian, Anabasis, 1. 18. 6-9 and 2. 24. 25 for other examples of Parmenio receiving a put down from Alexander. 
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empire. His speed was possible because he travelled lightly. This can actually be 
traced back to Philip II. But where did the inspiration for this come from? It can 
indeed be found in Xenophon:  
 
‘In the first place then, then’, Xenophon proceeded, ‘I think we should 
burn up the wagons which we have, so that our cattle may not be our 
captains, but we can take whatever route may be best for the army. 
Secondly we should burn up our tents also; for these, again, are a 
bother to carry, and no help at all either for fighting or for obtaining 
provisions. Furthermore, let us abandon all our other superfluous 
baggage, keeping only such articles as we use for war, or in eating and 
drinking, in order that we may have the largest possible number of 
men under arms and the least number carrying baggage’ (Xenophon, 
Anabasis, 3.2.27-28, Brownson tr.). 
 
Alexander seems to have been well aware that the Persian Empire was made up of 
independent satrapies which were slow to come together. Certainly he understood the 
importance of speed, and used it to his advantage a number of times during his 
campaigns. Yet it might be argued that he used his speed only in a localised way; that 
is, he allowed Darius in general terms to re-establish himself after his army had twice 
been defeated. One could argue further that he was pursuing a different policy, that of 
thalassocracy, but for the purposes of this paper I can say that once again Xenophon’s 
information given in the Anabasis, if read, did not directly influence his strategic 
choices. 
If, in spite of the few apparent overlaps with the Anabasis, anyone wishes to 
argue for the influence of Xenophon’s writings on Alexander the Great it seems to me 
that they would find the text of the Agesilaus a more fruitful place to begin. This is a 
text that provides more support for the view that Alexander had indeed read his 
Xenophon. In this context its importance has gone unnoticed. The Agesilaus was 
written in honour of the Spartan king, Agesilaus II. Agesilaus was the first Spartan 
king to be sent on campaign in Asia, where his aim was to liberate the Greek cities 
from Persian control. In this he achieved some degree of success in 396-5, before he 
had to return quickly to Greece to face a coalition of Sparta’s Greek enemies, which 
resulted in the battle of Coronea in 394. What is important for us is that Xenophon, 
having survived the retreat from Cunaxa; then enrolled as a mercenary under, among 
others, Agesilaus. He formed a very strong bond with him and actually returned from 
Asia to fight at Coronea with Agesilaus against his native city Athens, for which he 
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was exiled. The Agesilaus is similar to the Cyropaedia in that its purpose is to praise 
its subject. But before Xenophon gets into the praise aspect he does give a brief 
summary of Agesilaus’ campaign in Asia and in particular he notes Agesilaus’ 
attitudes to, and methods of, dealing with the Persians. Since Agesilaus was quite 
successful in this we might assume there was much Alexander might have learned.  
In military terms Alexander’s behaviour, first in Asia Minor and then beyond, 
has often been thought strange. Sparing the enemy, giving them back their land and 
giving them positions of importance within his own army certainly flew in the face of 
the customary view ‘to the victors, the spoils’; it went directly against the advice of 
his former teacher, Aristotle, and against the views of that supreme Panhellenist, 
Isocrates. Both of these educators advised against treating the barbarians with any 
kind of leniency. Alexander clearly paid scant attention to this:  
 
He [Alexander] banned his men from pillaging Asia, telling them they 
should spare their own property and not destroy the things which they 
had come to possess (Justin, Epitome, 2. 6. 1., Yardley tr.). 
 
His relationship with the people he conquered was also far from traditional:   
 
Alexander then made Calas satrap of the territory Arsites ruled, 
ordering the inhabitants to pay the same taxes as they used to pay to 
Darius; natives who came down from the hills and gave themselves up 
were told to return home (Arrian, Anabasis, 1. 17. 1-2, Brownson tr.).  
 
 
Although Hammond suggests that at this point Alexander 'was fortunate in having no 
ideology’28 it might be reasonable to suggest that he did have, at least, some kind of 
inchoate philosophy given his deliberate and consistent behaviour regarding the 
peoples and the lands, which he conquered. He allowed many natives to return to their 
farms. He took many of the conquered troops into his army, giving some of them 
positions of high command, greatly to the resentment of his own troops. All sources 
attest to this. In addition, he seldom laid waste the land he conquered; in fact he made 
it abundantly clear why he would not do so after his first victory at the Granicus. 
Where did Alexander get these ideas? From his reading of Xenophon perhaps?  
 
                                                 
28 Hammond, N.G.L., Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman, 78. 
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But subsequently the Persians affairs began to look even more bleak, 
while Agesilaus went from strength to strength. Every tribe and every 
nation sent envoys to seek his friendship, and a number of places 
longed for freedom so much that they went so far as to rebel against 
Persia and seek his protection instead, with the result that Agesilaus 
found himself becoming the leader not only of Greeks but of large 
numbers of non-Greeks. He behaved in these circumstances in a way 
that deserves an extraordinary degree of admiration. He was now the 
ruler of a great many communities on the mainland, and a great many 
of the Aegean islands too, since the state had attached the fleet to his 
command as well; his fame and power were on the increase, there was 
nothing to stop him doing as he wanted with all the advantages 
available to him, and on top of everything he was intending and 
hoping to overthrow the empire which had in the past invaded Greece 
(Xenophon, Agesialus, 1. 35-36, Waterfield tr.). 
 
The situation that Agesilaus found himself in on his arrival in Asia Minor bears a 
remarkable similarity to the circumstances of the young Alexander in 334 B.C.  
 
Agesilaus appreciated that a devastated and depopulated land would 
be unable to support an army for long, whereas an inhabited and 
cultivated land would be a permanent source of nourishment, so he 
took care to win some of his enemies over with leniency, as well as 
defeating others by force of arms. It was a frequent injunction to his 
men not to treat prisoners-of-war as criminals to be punished, but as 
human beings to be guarded; and if ever he noticed, when shifting 
camps, that any small children had been abandoned by the dealers 
(who would commonly try to sell the children because they doubted 
that they would be able to support them and feed them), he took care 
that they were rounded up and taken off somewhere. He also gave 
orders that any prisoners who were abandoned because of their old 
age were to be provided for, to prevent their being killed by dogs or 
wolves. Consequently, he came to be regarded with goodwill not just 
by those who heard about this behaviour of his, but even by his 
prisoners-of-war. Whenever he brought a community over to his side, 
he refused to let the inhabitants serve him as slaves serve their masters 
and required from them only the obedience due to a ruler from free 
subjects; and his kindness gained him control even of strongholds 
which were impervious to brute force’ (Xenophon, Agesilaus, 1. 20-
22, Waterfield tr.). 
 
There are a striking number of parallels between the behaviour of Agesilaus, as 
described by Xenophon, and Alexander while in Asia. Not the generalities of the 
Cyrpoaedia, but specifics: the treatment of conquered peoples and the treatment of 
conquered land; their attempts to present themselves as shelters against Persian 
aggression. The parallels seem too close to me to suggest mere happenstance. Did 
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Alexander absorb the lessons of the Spartan king? Did he read the Agesilaus? 
Perhaps. The Agesilaus probably presents the most interesting parallels, and yet, by 
and large, it is neglected by those who write with some conviction that Alexander 
knew his Xenophon. My main point then is that the case is far from clear and those 
who argue that Alexander read Xenophon still have a case to prove. I want to finish 
by examining why so many have been drawn to make that assumption in the first 
place. 
Is there the possibility that Alexander has been redrawn as Greek rather than as 
a Macedonian hero? In assuming that he read his Xenophon we are assuming that he 
had regard for things Greek. But is this the case? We must not be misled by Plutarch 
where Alexander is represented as the new Achilles, the ideal warrior.29 How inspired 
was Alexander, a Macedonian, by Greek literature and how much is that assumption 
the result of a literary invention of the Greeks? What makes us assume that he would 
have read Xenophon in the first place (an assumption made by numerous writers). As 
Eduard Zeller pointed out, the famous story that Aristotle took charge of the education 
of Alexander lacks support from any reliable or near contemporary source. Aristotle 
was of course a Macedonian anyway. The wonderful anecdotes wherein Alexander 
and his companions recite snatches from Greek tragedies, especially Euripides, a 
resident at the Macedonian court in his final years, may well tell us more about the 
style, techniques and aspirations of our sources than it does about Alexander’s actual 
interest in Greek literature. Some of what Plutarch says is simply not credible. 
Plutarch was influenced by the record of Onesicritus, Alexander’s helmsman. 
Onesicritus was a Cynic philosopher and those traits are therefore passed on to 
Alexander. In Plutarch we are presented with the idea that Alexander was spurred on 
by Greek ideals and achieved his success through these and not through the lessons 
that he learned from his father Philip:  
 
For who has ever put forth with greater or fairer equipment … Yes, 
the equipment he had from Aristotle his teacher when he crossed over 
into Asia was more than what he had from his father Philip (Plutarch, 
Moralia, 327e-f)  
 
This is nonsense. The idea that Alexander the Great led his forces with a spear in one 
hand and Greek literature in the other (Xenophon, and, Homer, of course) is simply 
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not tenable. Yet because of appropriation by the Greeks many writers have gone 
looking for Alexander in Xenophon and have found him there regardless of the 
evidence. 
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